Domestic and international dimensions of transboundary water politics by Menga, Filippo
Domestic and international dimensions of 
transboundary water politics 
Article 
Published Version 
Creative Commons: Attribution­Noncommercial­Share Alike 4.0 
Open access 
Menga, F. (2016) Domestic and international dimensions of 
transboundary water politics. Water Alternatives, 9 (3). pp. 
704­723. ISSN 1965­0175 Available at 
http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/72317/ 
It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the 
work. 
Publisher: Water Alternatives network 
All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, 
including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other 
copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in 
the End User Agreement . 
www.reading.ac.uk/centaur 
CentAUR 
Central Archive at the University of Reading 
Reading’s research outputs online
www.water-alternatives.org   Volume 9 | Issue 3 
Menga, F. 2016. Domestic and international  
dimensions of transboundary water politics. 
Water Alternatives 9(3): 704-723 
Menga: Domestic and international dimensions of transboundary water politics Page | 704 
 
Domestic and International Dimensions of Transboundary Water 
Politics 
Filippo Menga 
University of Manchester, School of Environment, Education and Development, Manchester, UK; 
filippo.menga@manchester.ac.uk  
ABSTRACT: A considerable amount of research in the field of International Relations (IR) has acknowledged the 
interplay between domestic politics and foreign policy. Few studies, however, have investigated this phenomenon 
in the narrower field of transboundary water politics. There is also a general lack of research exploring how the 
formation of a national identity can overlap with the construction of a large hydraulic infrastructure, and how this 
can have repercussions at the international level. This paper draws on Robert Putnam’s (1988) two-level game 
theory to illustrate how the interrelation between the domestic and the international dimensions matters in 
transboundary water politics. Perspectives from IR, political geography, and water politics serve to present a 
conceptual framework which is then linked to studies on nationalism. This helps to highlight the analytical 
relevance of such a perspective to understand the issue of large dams. The paper takes the cases of the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia and the Rogun Dam in Tajikistan as examples. 
 
KEYWORDS: Transboundary water politics, hydropolitics, international relations, nationalism, dams, Ethiopia, 
Tajikistan 
INTRODUCTION 
The management of transboundary water resources has gained a central role in the political agenda of 
countries across the world. While in the 1990s Miriam Lowi’s (1995) distinction between the 'low 
politics' of water and the 'high politics' of war and diplomacy seemed generally acceptable, it is now 
appropriate to refer to a global 'high politics of water'1 (Nicol et al., 2012). Concurrently, the study of 
transboundary water politics (or hydropolitics) as a discipline has evolved over time. Aarun P. Elhance’s 
(1999: 3) view of hydropolitics, which he saw as "the systematic study of conflict and cooperation 
between States over water resources that transcend international borders", effectively sums up the 
dichotomous approach towards the discipline maintained in the 1990s and early 2000s. Scholars saw 
water as a reason for either conflict or cooperation, thus mirroring the two main discourses forming the 
rationalist paradigm of International Relations (IR), realism, and liberalism. More recently, research has 
shown that conflict and cooperation can coexist in any given international river basin (Earle et al., 2010; 
Mirumachi, 2015), and scholars have emphasised how critical interdisciplinary perspectives can further 
the understanding of transboundary water politics (Sneddon and Fox, 2006; Warner and Zeitoun, 2008; 
Wegerich and Warner, 2010; Julien, 2012). Indeed, research on the 'politics of water' (broadly 
understood as in Mollinga, 2008) can draw from, and span, several disciplines (a non-exhaustive list 
would include geography, economics, engineering, law, development studies, sociology, international 
                                                          
1
 Although we should bear in mind, as Frederic Julien (2013) observes, that a hydrocentric reasoning might be plausible for a 
biologic person, while states are after all not as obsessed with water as thirsty individuals (rightly so) are.  
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relations, political science, and anthropology), as it is, for instance, evident from the editorial manifesto 
of the journal Water Alternatives2 and from the articles published therein. 
This inherent interdisciplinarity, matched with relatively recent academic attention, makes the study 
of water issues an extremely challenging and exciting matter, as many avenues must yet be explored or 
discovered. Rather than review all gaps and limitations within the study of water politics, in this paper I 
will limit my attention to two aspects that have been somehow overlooked and that, if linked, can 
arguably bring useful insights to the analysis of transboundary water relations and open up new 
research questions: i) the interrelation between domestic politics and international relations and ii) the 
influence of nationalism and nation-building processes on transboundary water relations.  
The necessity to focus on these two aspects originally stemmed from what Robert Jervis defined as 
one of the longstanding debates in IR (Schouten, 2008): on what level of analysis among the three 
identified by Kenneth Waltz (1959) – individuals, States, and the international system – should we focus 
to explain outcomes in interstate relations? While this matter finds a parallel in political geography, 
and, more recently, in issues related to water governance (see Norman et al., 2012 and the themed 
section featured in Volume 5, Issue 1 of Water Alternatives), in mainstream transboundary water 
politics States have largely been taken as analytical black boxes (e.g. Wolf, 1998; Toset et al., 2000; 
Yoffe et al., 2004). If, on the one hand, I tend to concur with Allan and Mirumachi (2010: 15) when they 
observe that "[p]oliticised and securitised relations over transboundary water disappear first into 
ministries of foreign affairs and then, on the other, into what has become known as the shadow state",3 
domestic politics can (and should) be problematised, as they can indeed influence international politics 
and vice versa. I will thus draw on Robert Putnam’s (1988) two-level game theory and further develop 
the work initiated by Warner and Zawahri (2012) to illustrate how the interrelation between the 
domestic and the international dimensions matters in transboundary water politics.  
I will then link this, for analytical and explanatory purposes, to another question which has so far 
received little attention (Allouche, 2005; Menga, 2015), namely how studies on nationalism and issues 
related to the formation of a national identity can be used to explain transboundary water politics. I will 
suggest in more detail that the formation of a national identity can overlap with the construction of a 
large hydraulic infrastructure, such as, for example, a large dam,4 and that this can, in turn, have 
repercussions at the international level. The decision to focus on large dams is relevant for at least two 
reasons. First, due to their sheer size and their multilevel impact, large dams offer a good platform to 
analyse both the domestic and the international spheres. This is because at the internal level, ruling 
elites can use dams to shape national identities and gain legitimacy and consent, portraying them as a 
panacea, a symbol of national pride and honour, of progress and prosperity (Menga, 2015). At the same 
time, dams also have a foreign dimension, since they can, for instance, alter the natural flow of rivers, 
thus causing tensions among basin riparians. A government can then portray the construction of a dam 
against the will of a neighbouring country as a symbol of internal cohesion that epitomises the nation’s 
right to self-determination, its sovereignty over water resources, and its assertion of national interests. 
Second, following a decline in their number from the 1970s onwards, dams are now back on the global 
agenda, and hundreds of new, extremely costly, and controversial projects have been launched in the 
last few years (Gleick, 2011). In a time marked by increasing attention to, and concern over, a pending 
                                                          
2
 Accessible at www.water-alternatives.org/index.php/manifesto.  
3
 By 'shadow state' the authors refer to the process by which the topic of sharing transboundary water resources gets lost in 
inter-ministerial labyrinths. They make the example of how, in the UK, it was impossible to identify the department responsible 
for the country’s position on the 1997 UN Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (Allan and 
Mirumachi, 2010: 25). 
4
 The International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) defines a large (or major) dam as a dam with a height of 150 m or more 
from the foundation, a reservoir storage capacity of at least 25 km
3
 and an electricity generation capacity of at least 1000 MW 
(ICOLD, 1998). 
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water crisis worldwide, it is essential to further delve into the motives behind a government’s decision 
to engage in the construction of these megaprojects. 
Therefore, this study aims to expand the research agenda in the field of water politics by pursuing 
two main and connected goals. First, to illustrate the ways in which the interrelation between domestic 
politics and foreign policy matters in transboundary water politics. Second, and consequently, to argue 
that considering mega-dams as a nation-building tool can bring new and unexplored insights to the 
analysis of transboundary water relations. To do so, this paper has been organised as follows. The next 
section draws upon perspectives from IR, political geography, and water politics to illustrate the 
multilevel and multi-scalar nature of transboundary water relations. The third section connects this 
conceptual framework with insights from studies on nationalism, highlighting the analytical relevance 
of such a perspective to the issue of large dams, which will be discussed more in detail in the fourth 
section. The fifth section reviews two examples of internationally controversial dams that fit within this 
framework, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in Ethiopia and the Rogun Dam in Tajikistan. 
Proponents of both projects are presenting them as a matter of national pride and identity, using 
hydraulic development to increase control over a territory and assert absolute territorial sovereignty. 
The article concludes by discussing implications for the study of water politics and suggesting a number 
of questions for future research. 
IMAGES, LEVELS AND SCALES 
Just like liberal theorist Ernst Haas, whose ontology "avoids fixed dogmas and unchanging universal 
values […] allowing for cognitive evolution and allying itself with an evolutionary epistemology" (Haas, 
2000: 419), I think that disciplines should interact, images of international relations should be 
associated with different interpretive understandings, perspectives should and could change, and 
theories should converse with each other. For instance, just because rationalist IR theories could not 
predict the end of the Cold War, it would be short-sighted and unfair to say that IR theory is a failure, as 
Gaddis (1922) claimed in a provocative article, or that realism as an ontology cannot bring insights to, 
say, constructivism. It is with this mindset that I will carry out the following literature review, bringing 
together insights from various disciplines to further our understanding of water politics. 
As a starting point it is worth noting that, unlike in water politics, the interaction between domestic 
and foreign politics in IR has received considerable attention. As James Fearon (1998) observed, a 
"significant amount of recent research in the international relations (IR) field advances the proposition 
that domestic politics is typically a crucial part of the explanation for states’ foreign policies" (Fearon, 
1998: 289-290). In this regard, Kenneth Waltz’s (1959) renowned book Man, the State, and War was 
the first to prompt a discussion on where to look for the major causes of war among three images: 
"within man, within the structure of the separate states, within the state system" (Waltz, 1959: 12). 
Going beyond the need to understand the causes of war, the matter of the levels of analysis, as David 
Singer (1960) defined it in his review of Waltz’s book, gained relevance as a broader question, that is, 
whether we should select "the micro- or macro-level of analysis" (Singer, 1961: 77) in the study of 
international relations. Subsequently, Waltz (1979) refined his theory and came to the conclusion that 
while states can affect international politics, domestic politics do not influence foreign policy,5 thus 
adopting a macro-level of analysis. Waltz acknowledged that different domestic structures, i.e. the 
second image, might limit political leaders in their abilities to act as they prefer, making an example of 
the dissimilar constraints faced by the US President and the British Prime Minister. Waltz’s structural 
                                                          
5
 Along a similar line, the notable realist scholar Hans Morgenthau (1973) made a strong distinction between domestic and 
foreign policy, arguing that the two should not be studied as a whole. For a comprehensive review of the literature exploring 
the connections between foreign and domestic politics in IR, refer to Hendla (2009).  
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realism is indeed a theory of the constraints in foreign policy, and it would be an error "to mistake a 
theory of international politics for a theory of foreign policy" (Waltz, 1979: 121).  
Arguing against Waltz’s vision of the domestic structure as an independent (and sometimes 
irrelevant) variable for international affairs, Peter Gourevitch (1978) reversed the second image 
argument to underline how international politics affect the domestic structure, with the latter 
becoming the dependent variable. What seems relevant in Gourevitch’s work is his acknowledgement 
of the reciprocal relationship between the two: "[e]conomic relations and military pressures constrain 
an entire range of domestic behaviours, from policy decisions to political forms. International relations 
and domestic politics are therefore so interrelated that they should be analysed simultaneously, as 
wholes" (Gourevitch, 1978: 911).  
The work of Robert Putnam (1988) led to a further development of the study of the interrelation 
between the domestic and the international. Starting from the assumption that it is "fruitless to debate 
whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the reverse" (Putnam, 1988: 427), 
Putnam criticised both Waltz’s second image argument and Gourevitch’s second image reversed 
argument, as both "would miss an important part of the story, namely, how the domestic politics of 
several countries became entangled via an international negotiation" (Putnam, 1988: 430). Using the 
example of the Bonn Summit Conference of 1978, where an agreement was reached only because each 
government supported domestically the policy being put forward at the international level, Putnam 
suggested an approach that accounts concurrently for the interaction of domestic and international 
factors.  
His popular two-level game approach "recognises that central decision-makers strive to reconcile 
domestic and international imperatives simultaneously" (Putnam, 1988: 460), since statesmen often 
face strategic dilemmas and have to play a multiple-level game, in line, apparently, with Hoffmann’s 
(1972) view of world politics as distinct issue areas placed on alternative chessboards, each with a 
different weight. As is often the case with seminal works, the two-level game theory has attracted 
criticism, partly because of its oversimplification of complex interstate relationships (Schoppa, 1993) 
and for not taking into account a third level of analysis, that of regional and international organisations 
(among others, Knopf, 1993; Patterson, 1997). Yet, its value to the present analysis does not lie merely 
in its acknowledgement of two levels of analysis, but rather in the recognition of the multiple 'spaces of 
appearance' in which politicians need to perform. 
Putting aside the work of Putnam temporarily, we can find parallel concerns relating to the level of 
analysis also in the field of political geography (among others, Delaney and Leitner, 1997; Cox, 1998; 
Newman and Paasi, 1998; Flint and Taylor, 2007; Herod and Wright, 2008; Neumann, 2009) and 
political ecology (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Swyngedouw, 1997; Swyngedouw and Heynen, 2003; 
Brown and Purcell, 2005; Neumann, 2009), where scholars have tried to define different spaces and 
scales to understand, for instance, the interplay between transient natural resources and the political 
constructs – such as states, institutions, and borders – that have to manage them. In this regard, 
seminal research by John Agnew (1994; 2010) warned about the risk of falling into the territorial trap 
that relates to three geographical assumptions which laid the theoretical foundation for the three 
mainstream ontologies in IR theory (the realist, the neo-realist, and the liberal). The first assumption is 
that states are fixed units of sovereign space. The second is that the domestic is separated from the 
foreign, while the third is the assumption that the state existed prior to, and as a container of, society 
(Agnew, 1994). Therefore, the state should not be the fixed unit of analysis and the domestic/foreign 
polarity might be misleading when analysing international relations and political geography.6  
                                                          
6
 Agnew’s territorial trap recalls, in a way, what Buzan and Little defined as the 'Westphalian straitjacket', that is "the strong 
tendency to assume that the model established in seventeenth century Europe should define what the international system is 
for all times and places" (Buzan and Little, 2001: 25). In other words, the theoretical simplifications behind the notion of 
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What is analytically significant here is the emphasis on how space, territory, and society can be 
socially and politically constructed. The work of Erik Swyngedouw (2007) has, for instance, advanced 
the concepts of hydro-social territory and waterscape to illustrate how a socionatural space can be 
constructed and reconstructed by a national elite through discursive, ideological, cultural, scientific, and 
material practices. Within this framework, and as "a geographical construction, scales become arenas 
around which socio-spatial power choreographies are enacted and performed" (Swyngedouw, 2010: 8). 
Budds and Hinojosa (2012) further developed the concept of waterscape to explore not only how social 
processes can shape water but also how water, in its turn, can shape social relations beyond the 
watershed scale.  
And indeed, various scales of analysis need to be carefully considered to understand the politics of 
natural resources and of the most transient among them, water (refer for instance to Harris 2002, 2005; 
Sneddon and Fox, 2006; Furlong, 2006; Harris and Alatout, 2010; Norman et al., 2012; Norman et al., 
2016). Thus, the State (or in this case the nation) scale cannot be understood without the interstate (or 
international) scale and the basin-regional scale. As Harris puts it, "each of these functional scales can 
be understood in isolation, but can also be understood as being linked to processes, actors, and systems 
across all other scales of analysis" (Harris, 2005: 267). Political constructions of scale also play a role, 
and particular actors, such as politicians and decision-makers, can construct and adopt particular 
discourses at different scales. Trottier (1999), for instance, introduced the term parallel-sanctioned 
discourses to show how different discourses were promoted by the Palestinian Water Authority 
according to the receiving audience (national and international), to legitimise its actions and increase its 
control over a territory. 
Moving back to Putnam, we can now link his two-level game to the study of transboundary water 
politics, building upon the work of Luzi (2007), Warner (2008), Warner (2012), Warner and Zawahri 
(2012), and Thomas and Warner (2015). These authors explored the deep interrelation between 
domestic and international politics and its relevance to water politics, overall recognising that "national 
governments seek to maximise their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures at the international level, 
while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign developments" (Putnam, 1988: 434). Existing 
research examined, for instance, how local environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can 
influence transboundary water politics in the Tigris and Euphrates river basins (Warner, 2012) and in 
the Ganges and the Mekong basins (Zawahri and Hensengerth, 2012). Likewise, the role of non-State 
actors has been studied (Suhardiman and Giordano, 2012), along with the importance of national 
power struggles to gain control over transboundary waters in the Harirud/Tejen River Basin in Asia 
(Thomas and Warner, 2015). Nevertheless, the existing literature does not discuss how one of the more 
multidimensional phenomena in global politics – nationalism – can provide an analytical lens to further 
our understanding of the domestic-foreign interaction in water politics.  
The debate on scalar politics in relation to water governance as it was advanced by Norman et al. 
(2016) is relevant as it emphasises how political processes over water happen and can be observed 
beyond a fixed territory or administrative entity such as, for instance, a country. Further challenging the 
idea of borders and States as fixed entities, Norman (2015) explored the role of indigenous 
communities in transboundary water governance, including First Nations and Native Americans in the 
discussion of Canada-U.S. border relations and thus delving into the cultural politics of transboundary 
water governance. 
Based on this, and expanding on insights from Harris and Alatout (2010), who linked the politics of 
hydrological scale to nation and State building in the Middle East to argue that water is central to the 
consolidation of the nation and its authority, in the following section I will connect the abovementioned 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
Westphalian sovereignty have led to a limited (and Eurocentric) understanding of international politics and security studies 
where the State is the only referent object. 
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conceptual framework with insights from studies on nationalism, laying the premises for a new 
approach to the study of large dams.  
TWO-LEVEL GAME AND STUDIES ON NATIONALISM 
As illustrated by Jan Selby (2006), the nation as a social construct and nationalism as a phenomenon 
have attracted harsh criticism from post-colonialist studies and postmodernism in general, as nations 
and States eventually lead to the dominance of one identity over other(s) and to the loss of internal 
differences. Homi K. Bhabha (1991: 6), for instance, paraphrased Joseph Conrad’s famous preface to 
The Nigger of the Narcissus to define the nation as "one of the dark corners of the earth". Nevertheless, 
in spite of all the damages that nationalism might have made to the planet7 (for arguments on the evil 
consequences of nationalism refer, for instance, to Brighouse, 1997; and Lichtenberg, 1997), I agree 
with Anthony Smith (1995) when he argues that nationalism is here to stay for at least three reasons: i) 
nationalism is politically necessary; ii) national identity is socially functional; and iii) the nation is 
historically embedded. As Smith pointed out (1979: 1), "[n]o other vision has set its stamp so 
thoroughly on the map of the world and on our sense of identity", and it therefore still seems highly 
relevant to study nationalism to understand contemporary events.  
The lively debates in studies on nationalism (the most notable is perhaps the debate between the 
primordialists, who see the nation as a timeless phenomenon, and the postmodernists, who view the 
nation as modern and constructed), are not reflected in the study of water politics where, for instance, 
the connection between water and nationalism (and nation-building) has been so far surprisingly 
overlooked. Such a connection seems straightforward because both nationalism as an ideology 
(especially in extreme forms such as fascism) and water as a resource have, often, been singled out as a 
cause of international conflicts, and both can be linked with the notions of territory, sovereignty, and 
self-determination.  
Of further relevance to the present study is the fact that the abovementioned images and scales 
have a parallel in studies on nationalism, where several levels of analysis also need to be considered. 
This is, for instance, the innovative analytical suggestion advanced by Karolewski and Suszycki (2011), 
who dropped the traditional one-level vision of nationalism to bring to the fore a nonhierarchical 
heuristic model based on four levels of analysis that can interact between them: i) the individual; ii) the 
societal or political discourse; iii) the governmental; and iv) international relations. To understand 
nationalism we have to emphasise that just as scale can be politically constructed, so can nationalism, 
and the nature of this ideological construction can change depending on the audience (e.g., a domestic 
or an international one). 
Thus, if we assume that the term nationalism contains the ideological means necessary to reproduce 
the nation (Billig, 1995), and that the nation is a social or cultural construct with limited spatial and 
demographic extent (in line with Anderson’s [2006] interpretation of the nation as an imagined political 
community), we can appreciate how a nation and a national identity can be deliberately constructed. 
While the concept of nation-building remains controversial (Polese, 2011), for the purpose of this study 
a fitting definition (inspired by the work of Kolstø and Blakkisrud, 2004) of the term covers the set of 
policies aimed at creating a common national identity and a sense of patriotism and loyalty toward the 
State. We should therefore examine States and nations as processes rather than as preexisting entities 
(Kuus and Agnew, 2008). Throughout these processes symbols and symbolism play a crucial role since 
                                                          
7
 Benedict Anderson (2006: 145) offered a different and more positive view of nationalism, seeing it as an integrative and 
cohesive force: "In an age when it is so common for progressive, cosmopolitan intellectuals (particularly in Europe?) to insist 
on the near-pathological character of nationalism, its roots in fear and hatred of the Other, and its affinities with racism, it is 
useful to remind ourselves that nations inspire love, and often profoundly self-sacrificing love". 
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ruling elites can use them to legitimise their actions, and motivate and mobilise their populations 
(Smith, 1998), enacting a top-down nationalism that creates a cohesive national identity (Mosse, 1975).  
As Flint and Taylor (2007) pointed out, nationalism is the dominant manner in which the political 
geography of the modern world is conceptualised, even though the idea of the nation permeates 
political geography to such a degree that the concept has been seen as largely unproblematic. And yet, 
Armiero and von Hardenberg (2014: 3) suggested that "we need to deal with multiple scales which 
'merge and intersect' in our lives. The nation is one of them", and is a particularly powerful one. 
Anderson (1986: 219) viewed nationalism as a territorial form of ideology, two-faced in its relation with 
space: "looking inward, it seeks to unify the nation and its constituent territory; looking outward, it 
tends to divide one nation and territory from another". This interpretation of the concept obviously 
takes inspiration from that advanced by Nairn (1975), who saw nationalism as essentially Janus-headed, 
since it faces both backward to a glorious past, and forward to a promising future.  
Nation-building processes and nationalism can be thus highly relevant to the study of political 
geography and also to that of transboundary water politics. In that last regard, one of the few (and still 
unpublished) studies that explored this connection is the one carried out by Jeremy Allouche (2005), 
who suggested that the concept of 'water nationalism' – which combines State-building and nation-
making – may be seen as one of the primary causes of transboundary water conflicts in the basins of 
the Aral Sea, the Jordan River, and the Indus River. Allouche (2010) observes that governments perceive 
and construct water not merely as a natural resource, but as an inherent part of the homeland, with 
water sites and constructions becoming part of the national landscape.8 The cause of water conflicts is 
not water scarcity, but rather the State nationalising its territory and refusing to recognise the 
transboundary character of water resources. In a subsequent study, Allouche (2010: 50) explained how 
State-building over water has operated in three ways to enhance control and power over water 
resources: "first, the dilution of authority from the local level; second, the creation of a water identity 
at the national level; and third, the (initial) refusal to recognise the international character of 
transboundary river basins". The State embedded water into the national collective identity using its 
symbolic value to make it a cohesive element in the nation-building process, in line with Anderson’s 
(2006) idea of an imagined community.9  
It is now clear that nationalism as a phenomenon has mutual ramifications at the domestic level and 
at the international level, and it therefore offers an appropriate analytical lens to explore the 
interconnections stemming from the two-level game in water politics. To this end, I will move my focus 
to large dams, whose construction, as I will illustrate, can overlap with the formation of a national 
identity while also affecting international relations. 
                                                          
8
 As it was highlighted by Lowenthal (1994), the strong link between geography and the formation of a national identity is 
indeed evident in the case of landscapes, which can be treated as national symbols by both citizens and politicians. 
9
 While the work of Allouche is the more insightful, other scholars have also explored the connection between water and 
national identity. Wirsing et al. (2013) have, for instance, linked water scarcity to water nationalism in Himalayan Asia, 
although they delved on the notion of national security rather than on that of identity. Alley (2006) took an anthropological 
stance at the Ganga Action Plan (a pollution-abatement initiative) in India, showing that one of its purposes was to 
ideologically unite the country in the conviction that the government is a benevolent 'water manager' (in a socialist 
acceptation of the term). Hoslag (2011) briefly mentioned India’s water nationalism (without providing a definition of the 
concept) while exploring the threat of a water war between China and India. Chellaney (2014) argued that in internationally 
shared waters the fusion between national identity and a river creates a sense of ownership that lead countries to see sharing 
waters as a zero-sum game. Kalpakian (2004) also attempted to illustrate that identity is what matters the most in conflicts, 
although his analysis appears theoretically weak in its contribution to transboundary water studies. 
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 MULTIDIMENSIONAL LARGE DAMS 
Large dams are arguably the most spectacular way to tame water resources. Besides representing 
human ingenuity and ability to tame nature, they can serve multiple purposes such as generating 
hydroelectricity, controlling water flows, and allowing irrigated agriculture and urban development. In 
his seminal book Oriental Despotism, Wittfogel (1957) advanced the concepts of hydraulic society and 
hydraulic despotism to denote how political elites might increase their grip on power by building and 
managing hydraulic infrastructures such as dams and networks of canals. Large dams can have both 
performative and discursive effects, and in his political analysis of Egypt, Mitchell (2002: 44) observed 
that thanks to their ability to capture the popular imagination, "large dams offered a way to build not 
just irrigation and power systems, but nation-states in themselves". Focusing on the construction of the 
Aswan High Dam, Mitchell noted how the Egyptian government ignored issues such as salinisation, 
waterlogging, and declining soil fertility, carrying out its construction without even attempting studies 
of costs and benefits, because the dam became the "centerpiece of postwar nation making in Egypt" 
(Mitchell, 2002: 45). 
Technological innovation has been studied as the benchmark by which nation States enact claims of 
modernisation and progress. For instance, Edgerton (2007) developed the concept of "techno-
nationalism" to denote the pride stemming from producing and exporting state-of-the-art technology. 
However, research has not explored how large dams can become a new tool of nation-building (Menga, 
2015; Isaacs and Polese, 2016). This seems even more significant considering that these projects are 
often realised with foreign technology by countries that do not possess the necessary technological and 
engineering expertise,10 and yet, this does not stop a ruling elite from appropriating them and framing 
them as national symbols.  
In spite of an abundant literature on dams, scholars have focused mostly on their economic, 
developmental, and environmental impacts (refer, among others, to Thukral, 1992; Khagram, 2004; 
Scudder, 2005; Turpin, 2008), rather than on their deep symbolism and political value (see for instance 
Reisner, 1993; McCully, 2001). In this last regard, one of the more insightful readings was produced by 
an environmental historian, Daniel Klingensmith (2007), who explored how dams in 20th century India 
and the United States became central in the creation of an ideology that featured imagined and re-
imagined notions of development. For Klingensmith, the rhetoric around dams can be seen as a 
dialectical process that leads to a political imagination of the nation and the world. While he does not 
see technology as ideology in Habermasian terms,11 he identifies a group of strategically placed 
individuals who "manage to appropriate and corrupt the development process and are able to 
undermine the coherence and viability of the scheme" (Klingensmith, 2007: 29).  
And indeed, in its report the World Commission on Dams12 (WCD, 2000) noted that "[f]rom the 
1930s to the 1970s, the construction of large dams became – in the eyes of many – synonymous with 
                                                          
10
 The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in Ethiopia, for instance, is being built by the Italian construction group Salini 
Impregilo. It is worth mentioning that in the 1930s Benito Mussolini’s Italy invaded and conquered Ethiopia, maintaining a 
military presence in the country until 1941.  
11
 Jürgen Habermas (1970) perceived the ideologisation of technology as a means through which ruling elites could 
overcomplicate technology and practical questions in such a way that the population is depoliticised and stripped of its 
participatory democratic rights.  
12
 As a result of the growing opposition to large dams, in 1997 the World Bank launched the work of the WCD, a body tasked to 
review the development effectiveness of large dams, along with their social, economic and environmental impact. This 
seeming new era for the hydropower sector was also marked by the establishment of the International Hydropower 
Association (IHA), an international organisation created under the auspices of UNESCO in 1995. In 2011 the IHA published the 
Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol (accessible at this link: 
www.hydrosustainability.org/IHAHydro4Life/media/PDFs/Protocol/hydropower-sustainability-assessment-protocol_web.pdf  
a document containing an elaborate complex scorecard to rate the sustainability of dam projects. 
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development and economic progress. Viewed as symbols of modernisation and humanity’s ability to 
harness nature, dam construction accelerated dramatically." (WCD, 2000: xxix). According to Worster 
(1984), who took as an example the Hoover Dam in the United States, large dams have been built 
following the illusion that men can dominate nature. Drawing from Horkheimer’s (1974) Eclipse of 
Reason, Worster argues that dominating nature also implies dominating men, since a few powerful 
individuals manage to get a concentration of social, economic, and political power through the 
construction of a dam. Kraak (2012) also analysed how an elite can use the symbolism of a large dam to 
legitimise a regime that lacks authority (as in the cases of Ethiopia and Kyrgyzstan), and Pritchard (2004) 
illustrated how State elites in France used the River Rhone to intertwine hydraulic technology with 
debates on national identity and State-building. As Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) effectively explained, 
megaprojects (and therefore also large dams) have to be considered as both political and physical 
objects for their meaning to be fully appreciated. A dam could indeed be metaphorically represented by 
a centaur, the mythological creature half man and half horse: its performative effects, those that are 
clearly visible such as the diversion of a river or the generation of hydroelectricity, epitomise the 
strength of the centaur, its animal side. Its rather hidden discursive dimension, the one connected with 
nation-building processes, corresponds to the sapiens part of the centaur, its ideological production 
(Menga, 2016).  
But what is also significant for the purpose of this analysis is that besides their symbolic and 
emotional significance at the national level, large dams also have an impact at the international level, 
since they can alter transboundary water flows and cause severe tensions in an international river 
basin. If we accept that a dam can symbolise a nation, then those who question a dam become the 
enemies of that nation. This is particularly apparent in a competitive setting marked by already tense 
relations among basin riparians, where the assertion (and protection) of national interests through the 
construction of a large dam happens at the expense of another nation. The expression 'zero-sum game', 
that in transboundary water politics is often used to define competitive scenarios where a gain for one 
actor implies a loss for another one, can correspond, after all, to a practical analytical application of the 
dualistic notions of 'self' and 'otherness' in studies on nationalism (Reicher and Hopkins, 2000).  
Following this interdisciplinary discussion, it is evident that a two-level game perspective can be 
relevant also to the study of transboundary water politics, where international relations and domestic 
politics are strongly interrelated. Furthermore, nationalism and nation-building do influence 
transboundary water relations, and large dams, due to their symbolic value, emerge as key tools with 
which to analyse this phenomenon. To further develop the above reflection, in the following I will 
briefly review two examples of well-known dams that fit within this framework – the GERD in Ethiopia 
and the Rogun Dam in Tajikistan – and will subsequently identify and suggest new avenues for future 
research.  
DISCUSSION 
Although the number of large dams being built worldwide started to decline in the 1970s, that trend 
changed in the 2000s, and several controversial projects have been launched in the last decade. China 
and India, in particular, are leading the new dam movement worldwide, driven by the prospect of more 
hydroelectricity and a boost in irrigated agriculture. And it is under these premises that the Ethiopian 
government is building the GERD (also known as the Millennium Dam) on the Blue Nile. The 
construction of this hydroelectric dam, which when finished will be the largest one in Africa and give a 
significant boost to the fulfilment of Ethiopia’s energy needs (Hammond, 2013), started in 2011 and is 
expected to be completed in 2017. The dam is strongly opposed by downstream Egypt, which is afraid 
of a reduction of its water inflow and sees the project as a violation of its historical rights over the Nile. 
These rights were, for instance, asserted in the 1960s by Gamal Abdel Nasser through the construction 
of the grandiose Aswan High Dam. 
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Beyond electricity generation, flood control, and grand irrigation schemes, the dam is charged with 
highly symbolic meanings by the Ethiopian ruling elite. As its name suggests, the dam embodies the 
reawakening of the Ethiopian nation, and it represents an essential element in the process aimed at 
reinventing and redefining Ethiopia’s identity, so that the country can deal with the challenges posed by 
ethnic federalism and a multi-ethnic society (Orlowska, 2013).  
The analytical significance of a two-level game perspective in water politics, and the relevance of 
nationalism to the study of large dams, become clear if we apply Karolewski’s and Suszycki’s (2011) 
three largest levels of analysis for studying nationalism – societal or political discourse, governmental, 
and international relations – to the narrative of the Ethiopian government around the GERD. What 
emerges is that the top-down nationalism enacted by the ruling elite reproduces an idea of the nation 
which is firmly grounded at both the domestic and the international levels.  
On the one hand, the GERD is presented as a national pride and success, as a project that is leading 
Ethiopia towards a glorious future built upon the ashes of an important imperial past, in line with 
Nairn’s (1975) metaphor of the modern Janus. This is evidenced, for instance, by the ubiquitous large-
scale patriotic billboards displayed around the country (see Figure 1), where the GERD is often linked to 
the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, a man with 'vision' and the protector of the nation. 
Furthermore, since 2011 (when construction work began), the main State-owned Ethiopian TV and 
radio channels have been providing constant updates to spur patriotism. To give just a few examples, it 
is common to see on the evening TV news programme reports of patriotic citizens vowing to work 
unpaid hours to buy dam bonds (BBC Monitoring, 2012a), discussing how to support the dam’s 
construction (BBC Monitoring, 2014), or celebrating the arrival of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 
Cup13 in their own city (BBC Monitoring, 2015). 
On the other hand, government officials are also framing the GERD as a foreign policy issue, 
emphasising that it is being built in spite of the opposition coming from Egypt and, to a lesser extent, 
Sudan. Significantly, while launching the construction of the GERD, Zenawi made an implicit reference 
to Egypt when he warned about the existence of an actor "attempting to undercut Ethiopia’s efforts to 
secure funding to cover the cost of the project" (Zenawi, 2011). In the same speech, Zenawi also urged 
the Ethiopian people to support the construction of the dam:  
No matter how poor we are, in the Ethiopian traditions of resolve, the Ethiopian people will pay any 
sacrifice. I have no doubt they will, with one voice, say: 'Build the Dam!' […] nothing can stop us from 
exercising our rights […] we not only have a plan, but we also have the capacity to assert our rights 
(Zenawi, 2011).  
A few months later, in an address to the Ethiopian Parliament which was broadcast on national TV, 
Zenawi explicitly singled out Egypt as the main obstacle to the construction of the GERD, laying the 
foundations for the upcoming framing of the dam as a tool of nationalism. According to Zenawi (BBC 
Monitoring, 2011), Egypt had spent the previous 100 years trying to disrupt Ethiopia’s efforts to build a 
large dam on the Nile. Zenawi accused Egypt of using military, diplomatic and financial means to 
interfere with his country’s hydraulic ambitions, adding that the Ethiopians need to be ready to contain 
further threats coming from Cairo in the future. Through this statement the Ethiopian Prime Minister 
clearly identified Egypt as the 'other' in relation to the Ethiopian 'self', as the external interference 
posing a threat to the development of Ethiopia both as a State and as a nation.  
                                                          
13
 A national football tournament named after the dam.  
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Figure 1. A billboard in Meskel Square, Addis Ababa, December 2012. 
 
Note: The billboard shows the late Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi together with some flagship projects of modern 
Ethiopia, including on the right the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam. The writing on the billboard (in Amharic) reads: "The 
vision and the mission that you started is near. By working hard we will get it/hold it!". Photo courtesy of Ane Hess-Nielsen. 
Indeed, from this moment on, Ethiopian politicians started to represent the GERD as a symbol of 
national self-determination, with Egypt filling the stage as the main rival, to the extent that local 
newspapers started rumouring about the Egyptians "hoping for Meles’ death to stop the Grand 
Ethiopian Renaissance Dam" (Tigrai Online, 2012). And while Zenawi did die in 2012, the Ethiopian 
government continued to deploy the same two-faced rhetoric portraying the dam both as a symbol of 
national pride and as an assertion of sovereignty against an antagonistic neighbour. Dina Mufti, the 
Spokesperson of the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tellingly explained that "Ethiopia is not 
intimidated by Egypt’s psychological warfare and won’t halt the dam’s construction, even for seconds" 
(Reuters, 2013), while at the internal level the government continued to festively celebrate the 
realisation of what is portrayed as a "unifying project that offers hope" (Bloomberg Business, 2015), 
whose realisation has become a tribute to the beloved and charismatic former Prime Minister Zenawi.  
Another meaningful example of how large dams can become a new-nation building tool for a top-
down nationalism enacted by the ruling elite with ramifications at both the domestic and the 
international level comes from Central Asia, where Tajikistan is attempting to build the large Rogun 
Dam. The project was originally planned by the Soviet Union in the 1960s, and its revamp in the 2000s 
has been criticised by downstream Uzbekistan, which perceives it as a threat to both the environment 
(the dam is located in a highly seismic area) and its annual water inflow. Similar to the GERD, if and 
when it is completed the Rogun Dam will generate large amounts of hydroelectricity in a country that 
suffers from recurrent energy crises. Furthermore, according to the Tajik government the dam will lead 
to an increase in irrigated agriculture that will bring benefits to both upstream and downstream basin 
riparians (Zarifi, 2009).  
Yet, what also strikes one about the Rogun Dam is that its meaning has gone beyond that of a simple 
multipurpose dam. As Menga (2015; 2016b) highlighted, the Tajik government has framed it "as a 
matter of national pride, a fundamental leap forward in national development, an existential 
achievement for the survival of the country, and ultimately, a matter of life and death" (Menga, 2015: 
490). The Tajik President Emomali Rahmon has often reiterated that the dam is Tajikistan’s national 
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idea (see for instance Rahmon, 2009; 2010), defining it as "a source of endless light which will turn 
Tajikistan into an ever-shining star in the ancient East!" (Rahmon, 2010). As with the GERD, the main 
cities of Tajikistan were covered by patriotic billboards presenting the dam as a national priority (see 
Figure 2), and citizens were asked to show their patriotism by buying shares of the Rogun Joint Stock 
Company. Pupils had to recite patriotic verses about the dam, such as "Roghun is our 
national pride, our brightest future. It’s the light in Central Asia!" (Al Jazeera, 2010), and the Tajik 
Education Minister Abdujabbor Rahmonov explained that "how many shares a student will buy 
depends on his patriotism" (BBC Monitoring, 2010). Furthermore, the State-owned national TV and 
radio channels have been providing regular updates on the dam and the status of its construction, 
which were, however, interrupted in 2012 to allow the World Bank to carry out a feasibility study (The 
World Bank, 2014).  
Figure 2. A billboard in the Tajik capital Dushanbe, July 2010. 
 
The billboard displays the Tajik President Emomali Rahmon showing the way forward for his country while standing in front of 
the Rogun Dam construction site. The writing on the billboard (in Tajik) reads: "Rogun is the Life and Death of Tajikistan". 
Photo courtesy of Derek Henry Flood. 
The opposition of Uzbekistan, a country that has a longstanding rivalry with Tajikistan and that has so 
far managed to get the lion’s share of the Central Asian waters (Menga, 2014), seems to have 
reinforced Tajikistan’s resolve to carry out the project as an assertion of power and self-determination. 
The rhetoric adopted by the Tajik leadership portrays the dam as a symbol of national cohesion and 
patriotism, and in 2010 the then Tajik Prime Minister Akil Akilov significantly underlined how Uzbek 
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criticisms have no other effect than uniting the "people of Tajikistan in the idea of building this vitally 
important hydropower plant" (Akilov, 2010). Tajik elites accuse Uzbekistan of thwarting Tajikistan’s 
economic development ambitions through the disruption of energy supplies and the sabotage of 
transport corridors (BBC Monitoring, 2012; Shustov, 2012; Saipov, 2014; Stronski, 2016). Moreover, 
they present the Rogun Dam as a way to achieve energy self-sufficiency (BBC Monitoring, 2011a) in a 
setting where Uzbekistan is the country’s sole supplier of natural gas (The World Bank, 2012). When the 
Uzbek President Islam Karimov reportedly defined the Rogun Dam as a meaningless project, the Tajik 
newspaper Ozodagon eloquently countered: "An interesting point in the position of the Uzbek 
president on the construction of the Roghun power station is that he called the national project of an 
independent State a 'foolish' project, and with this he insulted a State and a nation" (BBC Monitoring, 
2010a). Mirroring this embittered conflict, an opinion poll conducted in Tajikistan in 2013 showed that 
a quarter of the respondents recognised Uzbekistan as a threat to Tajikistan (M-Vector, 2013), arguably 
as a result of the narrative adopted by the Tajik government.  
Both the GERD and the Rogun Dam illustrate how a two-level game perspective can be relevant to 
the study of transboundary water relations. At the domestic level, a hydraulic infrastructure can help 
legitimise those in power, channelling people’s attention while contributing to the creation of a 
national identity. This process is magnified by the international level, especially when a dam is opposed 
by a rival country. In these cases, constructing a dam also becomes a way to defend national interests, 
increase regional influence, and assert absolute territorial sovereignty in the terms enunciated by the 
Harmon doctrine.14 Dams thus exacerbate existing international tensions which, in turn, serve to 
buttress and legitimise the actions of the government that builds them. In addition to helping a 
government gaining popular support, framing a national issue as a foreign policy one can serve to 
distract public attention from other pressing matters and to deproblematise the environmental and 
societal consequences that come with the construction of a large hydraulic infrastructure (such as the 
resettlement of peoples, environmental impact, and financial costs). 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, I have argued that an analytical framework that accounts concurrently for the interaction 
of domestic and international factors, and where the nation scale is examined along with the 
international scale and the basin-regional scale, can lead to a better understanding of water politics. 
Examining states and nations as processes rather than as pre-existing entities can also improve our 
understanding of how a large dam can become a nation-building tool and therefore embed a meaning 
that goes beyond that of a mere hydraulic infrastructure.  
Clearly, I am not suggesting that all hydraulic development should be examined under this 
perspective, or that the ideological dimension of dam building is more important than the actual 
material effects that accompany these types of projects. However, and as I illustrated with the 
examples of the GERD and the Rogun Dam, both the ideational and the material dimensions should be 
taken into account to understand the drivers of hydraulic development (as was also argued by Molle et 
al., 2009; and Molle and Wester, 2009), and the apparently uncompromising attitude of the actors 
involved in regional disputes over shared water resources triggered by large dams. This approach is 
particularly useful to analyse cases of internationally controversial dams being built (or proposed) in a 
                                                          
14
 The Harmon doctrine – which takes its name from former US Attorney General Judson Harmon – is considered the most 
notorious theory in all of international resources law, and is today identified with the principle of absolute territorial 
sovereignty. It is based upon an opinion issued by Harmon in 1895 concerning a dispute between Mexico and the US for the 
use of a shared river, the Rio Grande. The doctrine basically states that "a country is absolutely sovereign over the portion of 
an international watercourse within its borders. Thus, that country would be free to divert all of the water from an 
international watercourse, leaving none for downstream states" (McCaffrey, 1996: 549). 
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competitive setting marked by already tense relations among basin riparians and a contested control of 
water resources. 
This framework could be fruitfully applied to critical hydropolitics studies and, in particular, to the 
branch dealing with the importance of discursive constructions and on the ways power, hegemony, and 
power asymmetries can influence transboundary water relations (among others, Zeitoun and Warner, 
2006; Cascão and Zeitoun, 2010; Zeitoun et al., 2011; Zeitoun et al., 2016; Menga, 2016a). Further 
research might explore how being the hegemon or the hegemonised (and consequently power 
relations) riparian influences domestic politics and the discourse adopted at the internal level to justify 
hydraulic development. To this end, suitable international river basins with asymmetric power 
configurations would include those of the Euphrates and Tigris, the Ganges, the Jordan, and the 
Mekong. 
Also, and following up on the arguments made by Warner and Zawahri (2012) regarding the 
influence of a regime type on the behaviour of riparians, further studies should be carried out to 
explore differences and similarities in the rhetoric adopted by democratic and authoritarian regimes 
when it comes to building a large hydraulic infrastructure. Authoritarian regimes that operate in a non-
competitive political setting with a weak (or nonexistent) civil society face fewer constraints at the 
domestic level than do democratic ones, and this might influence which strategies they adopt to 
legitimise their actions. Scott (1998), for instance, argued that being an authoritarian or a democratic 
regime played a crucial role in determining the fate of social engineering schemes in the 19th and early 
20th centuries, with authoritarian regimes being the force behind high modernism. Can we interpret 
the current boom in the dam building sector as a 21st century revamp of the ideology of high 
modernism? 
In addition, and with regard to a water literature that is now saturated with the securitisation 
discourse (Fischhendler, 2015), further research could also be conducted to determine whether it is 
appropriate to refer to the 'nationalisation' of water resources as one of the key determinants of 
international water conflicts. Framing hydraulic development as an assertion of the national interests of 
the 'self' against those of the 'other' can provide fresh and original insights to the analysis of 
transboundary water relations. This could appeal to constructivist perspectives to water studies, since 
the view of the 'self' as an offset of the 'other' recalls Wendt’s (1992) classic interpretation of agency 
and structure as being reciprocally constituted. This study could have discussed how the notions of 
agency and structure can help understand the reciprocal relationship of the domestic and international 
dimensions, but this would have overly expanded the already dense literature mobilised so far.  
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